This work introduces a formal analysis of the non-repudiation property for security protocols. Protocols are modelled in the process calculus LySa, using an extended syntax with annotations. Non-repudiation is verified using a Control Flow Analysis, following the same approach of Buchholtz and Gao for authentication and freshness analyses.
The advantages of this proposal are the following:
The analysis is general enough to check any protocol (even if in few exceptional cases the result can be incorrect). The environment in which the protocol is executed can possibly involve infinitely many principals who run infinitely many sessions.
The analysis can easily be implemented, providing a user-friendly tool which can automatically check the nonrepudiation property for any specified encoding.
It is interesting to notice that the non-repudiation analysis that we propose easily fits into the CFA framework [13] , yielding a suite of analyses that can be combined in various ways, with no major implementation overload. Since the analyses share the same framework differing only in the annotations, a combination of them might lead to a result with less resource consumption. This combination could be easily obtained by generalizing the syntax and turning the correspondent monitors on in the semantics.
The structure of the paper is the following: Section 2 is a quick overview of LySa; Section 3 presents the CFA framework; Section 4 shows the new non-repudiation analysis, and its application to the protocols; Section 5 concludes.
LySa
LySa [2] is a process calculus in the pÀcalculus tradition that models security protocols on a global network. It incorporates pattern matching into the language constructs where values can become bound to variables. In LySa all the communications take place directly on a global network and this corresponds to the scenario in which security protocols often operate. Channels are considered in many process calculi, but they may give a degree of security that there is not in the common network, where a spy can eavesdrop and forge communications; furthermore, channels are often declared private and used explicitly as cryptographic keys while in real systems they are extremely problematic. LySa calculus offers instead a realistic environment in which there are not channels to protect the exchange of messages among the principals.
Syntax and semantics
An expression E 2 Expr may represent a name, a variable or an encryption. The set Expr contains two disjointed subsets, Name and Var. The elements in the first subset can be identifiers, nonces, symmetric keys, key pairs (m + , m À ) for asymmetric key cryptography (where m + is the public key and m À is the private one), etc., ranged over by n. The elements in Var are only variables, ranged over by x. The remaining expressions are symmetric and asymmetric encryptions of k-tuples of other expressions, defined as fE 1 , . . . ,E k g E 0 and fjE 1 , . . . ,E k jg E 0 , respectively, where E 0 represents a symmetric or asymmetric key.
LySa also allows to construct processes P 2 Proc, which use the expressions explained above. Processes can have the following form: /E 1 , . . . ,E k S:P: the process sends a k-tuple of values onto the global network; when the message has been successfully sent the process continues as P.
(E 1 ,y,E j ;x j + 1 ,y,x k ).P: the process reads the k-tuple of values sent, it checks if the first j values expected are identical to E 1 ,y,E j , and, if this succeeds, the remaining kÀ j values are bound to the variables x j + 1 ,y,x k , and the process continues as P, which is the scope of the variables; notice that a semi-colon is used to distinguish between the expressions used for matching and the variables. decrypt E as fE 1 , . . . ,E j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k g E 0 in P: the process denotes the symmetric decryption and it works in a way similar to the input construct; if the encryption key is identical to E 0 , the process decrypts the k-tuple, then it checks if the values expected are identical to E 1 ,y,E j , and, if this succeeds, the remaining k À j values are bound to the variables x j + 1 ,y,x k , and the process continues as P, which is the scope of the variables; a semi-colon distinguishes between the expressions used for matching and the variables. decrypt E as fjE 1 , . . . ,E j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k jg E 0 in P: the process denotes the asymmetric decryption and it works like symmetric decryption; the only differences are in E 0 and in the key used to encrypt, which have to be a key pair m + and m À ; their order depends on the role of decryption, i.e. if it is used to verify a private key signature or to obtain the original message after a public key encryption.
A binder introduces new names or variables which have scope in the rest of the process. The prefix ðnnÞ in the process ðnnÞP and the prefix ðn 7 mÞ in the process ðn 7 mÞP are binders, because they create new keys which have scope in the process P. Also input and decryption are binders that introduce the variables x j + 1 ,y,x k . If a name or a variable is not bound by any binder, it is free; the function fn(P) collects all the free names in the process P and it is defined in Table 2 while the function fv(P), defined in Table 3 , collects the free variables. The bound variables are defined by the function bvðPÞ ¼ def varðPÞ\fvðPÞ, where var(P) is the function that defines the set of variables contained in a given protocol P; roughly speaking, bv(P) provides the set of all the variables that are not free in the protocol P. All these functions are also defined on the terms, which are part of the processes. LySa provides a reduction semantics that describes the evolution of a process step-by-step, using a reduction relation between two processes, written P-P 0 . If the reduction relation holds then P can evolve into P 0 using the rules depicted in Table 6 that show an inductive definition of the relation by axioms and inference rules.
The structural congruence between two processes, written P P 0 , means that P is equal to P 0 except for syntactic aspects, but this does not interfere with the way they evolve. The structural congruence is defined as the smallest relation satisfying the rules in Table 4 , that express the following ideas:
The reduction relation is an equivalence relation. The parallel composition is defined to be commutative, associative, and has 0 as neutral element. The order of the processes in the parallel composition is not influential. 
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Pair restriction P 1 jP 2 Parallel composition !P Replication 0 Nil Table 2 Function fn(P) for free names. The replication corresponds to an arbitrary number of process in parallel. The restrictions can be simplified under certain assumptions. Two processes are structurally equivalent whenever they are aÀequivalent.
Two processes P 1 and P 2 are aÀequivalent, written P 1 a P 2 , when they are identical except that they may differ in the choice of bound names. A procedure called a-conversion replaces all the instances of a bound name in a process for another name. The definition of the equivalence relation is in Table 5 . Notice that a substitution P½n 1 /n 2 substitutes all the free occurrences of n 1 in P for n 2 . Finally, we define values V 2 Val, which are used in the reduction as expressions without variables x 2 Var: Table 3 Function fv(P) for free variables. Table 4 Structural congruence P P 0 .
The reduction relation describes how a process may evolve into another and it is defined inductively as the smallest relation such that the rules in Table 6 are satisfied. A reference monitor is used to check each step before allowing it to be executed. It can be turned off or on: in the first case there are not requirements that have to be meet; in the other case some properties are checked at run time and, if the check does not succeed, the process execution is aborted.
A substitution function is used in the reduction rules, written P[V/x]; it substitutes a variable x for a value V in the process P whenever x becomes bound to V.
The rule (Com) is the parallel composition between an output process and an input process. This means that the communication between two principals happens only if these two processes run in parallel. Furthermore, the first j values V 1 ,y,V j sent have to be identical to the first j values V 0 1 , . . . ,V 0 j that the recipient expects. In this case, the variables are substituted with the values V j + 1 ,y,V k . The rules (Dec), (ADec) and (ASig) are used to decrypt messages with a symmetric key, a private key and a public key, respectively. As before, the first j values V 1 ,y,V j encrypted have to be identical to the first j values V 0 1 , . . . ,V 0 j that who decrypts the message expects. In this case, the variables are substituted with the values V j + 1 ,y,V k . The rule (New) and (ANew) restrict the scope of the names created, therefore they are visible only in the respective processes. The rule (Par) is the parallel composition that can evolve into a new parallel composition where one of the two processes involved is evolved while the other remains unchanged. The rule (Congr) allows to apply the reduction relation to any process that is structurally congruent to the process found in the other rules.
Meta level calculus
The meta level is an extension of LySa that can be used to describe different scenarios in which many principals execute a protocol at the same time. Thanks to this level the analysis can run in a realistic environment with many initiators and responders. This is done by running several copies of the processes and renaming each name and each variable using indexes, added to make them unique. Table 5 aÀequivalence a . Table 6 Semantics of LySa calculus.
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(Com) The syntax of the meta level is defined by the grammar described in Table 7 . Its constructs incorporate a countable indexing set S, which includes a set of variables X.
The meta level terms ME i are identical to the object level terms, i.e. the terms explained before, except that names, variables and asymmetric keys are indexed. A sequence of indexes i is added as subscript, that is a shorthand for i 1 ,y,i k . The meta level processes are the following: j i2S MP: the process describes the parallel composition of instances of the process MP where the index i is an element in the set S.
let X DS in MP: the process declares a set identifier X which has some values of the index set S in the process MP; the set X can be infinite, so that the meta level process may instantiate to infinitely many processes, specifying arbitrarily large scenarios.
ðn i2S n ai ÞMP: the process describes the restriction of all the names n ai ; a is a prefix of the index that can be empty. ; as above, a is a prefix of the index that can be empty.
/ME 1 , . . . ,ME k S:MP: the process sends a k-tuple of values onto the global network; when the message has been successfully sent the process continues as MP. ðME 1 , . . . ,ME j ; mx j þ 1 , . . . ,mx k Þ:MP: the process reads the k-tuple of values sent, it checks if the values expected are identical to ME 1 ,y,ME j , and, if this succeeds, the remaining k Àj values are bound to the variables mx j + 1 ,y,mx k , and the process continues as MP, which is the scope of the variables; a semi-colon is used to distinguish between the terms used for matching and the variables, as in the input process seen in the object level (the one described in Section 2.1).
decrypt ME as fME 1 , . . . ,ME j ; mx j þ 1 , . . . ,mx k g ME 0 in MP: the process denotes the symmetric decryption; it checks if the encryption key is identical to ME 0 , then the process decrypts the k-tuple, and it checks if the values expected are identical to ME 1 ,y,ME j , and, if this succeeds, the remaining k Àj values are bound to the variables mx j + 1 ,y,mx k , and the process continues as MP, which is the scope of the variables.
decrypt ME as fjME 1 , . . . ,ME j ; mx j þ 1 , . . . ,mx k jg ME 0 in MP: the process denotes the asymmetric decryption and it works like symmetric decryption except that ME 0 and the key used to encrypt have to be a key pair m + and m À .
ðnn i ÞMP: the process generates k new names n i , i 2 ½1: :k, and it continues as MP, which is the scope of the names. !MP: the process acts as an arbitrary number of processes MP composed in parallel. 0: the process is the inactive or nil process that does nothing.
The process let X DS in MP is a binder of X, therefore if X is instantiated to a subset of S then every occurrence of X in the process MP is instantiated. The process j i2S MP is a binder of i and the indexed restrictions are binders of names and key pairs. Table 7 Syntax of meta level LySa calculus.
/ME 1 , . . . ,ME k S:MP ðME 1 , . . . ,ME j ; mx j þ 1 , . . . ,mx k Þ:MP decrypt ME as fME 1 , . . . ,ME j ; mx j þ 1 , . . . ,mx k g ME0 in MP decrypt ME as fjME 1 , . . . ,ME j ; An instantiation relation, written MP-I P, is introduced to describe that a process P is an instance of a meta level process MP, as depicted in Table 8 .
The rule (ILet) allows the meta level to instantiate to all the object level processes P that are in some finite subset of the set S. The rule (IIPar) instantiates the process j i2S MP to be the parallel composition of processes for each of the indexes in the set S. The rules (IINew) and (IIANew) instantiate the indexed restrictions to the restrictions of the names for all the values in the set fa1, . . . ,akg. The rules (IOut), (IInp), (IDec), (IADec), (INew), (IANew), (IRep), (IPar) and (INil) are instantiations of their subprocesses. Example 1. Let us introduce a known non-repudiation protocol, namely the Zhou-Gollmann protocol [17] , which is the following:
where:
A is the originator of the non-repudiation exchange; B is the recipient of the non-repudiation exchange; TTP is the on-line trusted third party providing network services accessible to the public; M is the message sent from A to B; C is the encryption for the message M under a key K; K is the message key defined by A; L is a unique label that links all messages of a particular protocol run together; Table 8 Instantiation relation MP-I P.
where D fin means finite subset
f Ã is a flag which expresses the aim of the message (the sender wants to give a proof of origin NRO/receipt NRR/ submission SUB/confirmation con_K);
A-B : X means that principal A sends message X from principal B; A2B : X means that principal A fetches message X from principal B.
The first message of the encoding provides B the encryption C of a message M under a key K; if the message fails to reach B then the protocol ends without disputes, since B cannot read M yet without the decryption key K. With the second step A is given the proof that B received the first message. After checking if B's evidence matches with A's evidence, A sends the decryption key K to the trusted third party TTP. Finally the trusted third party stores in a public directory a message consisting of the key and the proof that it belongs to a particular protocol session run by A and B; the principals can fetch the key through the fourth and the fifth messages (the order of the last two messages is not important).
Note that L and the proofs in the five messages must always match in order to eventually win a dispute, because they link the messages belonging to same session of the protocol.
The encoding is the following, where three key pairs (AK 7 for A, BK 7 for B, and KTTP 7 for the trusted third party) and a symmetric key (SK) are used: where the restrictions ðn 7 KTTPÞ, ðn 7AKÞ, and ðn 7 BKÞ define the key pairs used in the scope of the protocol. In particular the private keys, denoted by a minus, are used only by the subprocess modelling the behavior of the correspondent user; for example only the subprocess modelling the principal A can use the key AK À . Public keys, denoted by a plus, are known by all the principals in the network so that all of them can check signatures (or encrypt messages if the protocol requires this).
In this scenario we have modelled only three principals, each one with a specific role, but this is not realistic. In fact, in the global network there are many principals and this gives chances to an attack. Therefore we have to extend the protocol above with multiple principals, simply indexing each name, each variable and each parallel composition construct. We consider a scenario in which there are a trusted third party (an honest principal) and many initiators and responders. The set X contains both initiators and responders, so each principal can be one or the other. The resulting protocol is the following:
Control flow analysis
In this section we introduce our Control Flow Analysis (CFA) as an extension of [13] . The aim of the CFA is to collect information about the behavior of a process and to store them in some data structures A, called analysis components. To be finite, static analysis is forced to compute approximations rather than exact answers. Therefore the analysis can give false positives but it has to preserve soundness.
We will use Flow Logic settings for the specification and the proofs. It is a formalism for specifying static analysis and it focuses on the relationship between an analysis estimate and the process to be analysed, formally: AFP which is a predicate that holds when A is a description of the behavior of the process P.
CFA abstracts the executions and represents only some aspects of the behavior of a process which can also be infinite. We will prove the correctness of the analysis by showing that the analysis components A are such that the property they represent also holds when the process evolves. Formally:
The Flow Logic specifications can be of the following formats.
Definition 1 (Verbose Format). A Verbose Flow Logic specification records information about a process globally, by rules of the form AFP iff a logic formula F holds that means that the analysis components A are estimates of the process P if and only if the logic formula F holds. Table 9 Analysis of terms and processes.
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(AN) The analysis of terms and processes is described in Table 10 The meta level analysis.
r,kF G decrypt ME as fME 1 , . . . ,ME j ;
r,kF G decrypt ME as fjME 1 , . . . ,ME j ;
and the continuation process is analysed. The rules (ASDec), (AADec) and (AASig) evaluate the expression E into the set W and the first j expressions in the decryption constructs are evaluated to be the sets W i for i=1,y,j; if the pattern match with the values in k is successful, the remaining values of the k-tuple are recorded in r as possible binding of the variables and the continuation process is analysed. Notice that the original syntax [4, 7] uses only the rule (AADec) to define both asymmetric decryption and signature while we introduce here two rules imposing an order in the choice of the keys to make our analysis more efficient. The rules (ANew), (AANew), (APar) and (ARep) require that the subprocesses are analysed. The rule (ANil) deals with the trivial case. Whenever the requirements hold, the continuation process is analysed. The analysis is also defined for the meta level as an extension of the analysis seen so far and it takes the form r,kF G M where G : SetID [ PðIndex fin Þ-PðIndex fin Þ is a mapping from set identifiers to finite sets of indexes. To solve the problem of infinite object level processes we use again the canonical representation of the names. The analysis is defined in Table 10 , and the new rules are explained below; the rest of the rules are similar to the ones for analysing object level (the one seen so far), except that they range over indexed names and variables.
The rule (MLet) updates G with the mapping X/S 0 , where S 0 is required to be finite and it has the same canonical names as the set S. The rule (MIPar) expresses that the analysis holds for all the processes where the index i is substituted by all the elements in GðSÞ. The rules (MINew) and (MIANew) ignore the restriction operators.
The attacker
The attacker is unique and runs its protocol P following the Dolev-Yao formula F DY RM [6] . We write P sys jP to show that an arbitrary attacker controls the whole network while principals exchange messages using the protocol. A protocol process P sys has type whenever it is close, all its free names are in N f , all the arities of the sent or received messages are in A k and all the arities of the encrypted or decrypted messages are in A Enc . These three sets are finite, like N c and X c , used to collect all the names and all the variables, respectively, in the process P sys . The attacker uses a new name, n = 2N c , and a new variable, z = 2X c , which do not overlap the names and the variables used by the legitimate principals. It is again considered a process with finitely many canonical names and variables. A formula F DY RM of the type ðN f ,A k ,A Enc Þ, which is capable of characterizing the potential effect of all the attackers P of the type ðN f ,A k ,A Enc Þ, is defined as the conjunction of the components in Table 11 .
Non-repudiation analysis
Non-repudiation guarantees that the principals exchanging messages cannot falsely deny having sent or received the messages. This is done using evidences [11] that allow to decide unquestionably in favor of the fair principal whenever there is a dispute. In particular, non-repudiation of origin provides the recipient with proof of origin while non-repudiation of receipt provides the originator with proof of receipt. Evidences [18] should have verifiable origin, integrity and validity.
The syntax of the process calculus LySa has to be extended to guarantee, given a protocol, the non-repudiation property, i.e. authentication (only the sender of the message can create it), integrity and freshness. This is done using electronic signatures and unique identifiers for users and sessions. To this aim, we introduce two sets, used in the body of the messages to collect information that will be useful to perform the analysis: ID, where id 2 ID is a unique identifier for a principal, and NR, where nr 2 NR says that non-repudiation property is required for that part of the message nr. To include this sets in our analysis, a redefinition of the syntax of LySa is required, as shown in Table 12 . Observe that, with respect to Table 11 The attacker's capabilities.
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(1)
The attacker may learn by eavesdropping V
The attacker may learn by decrypting messages with keys already known V k2AEnc 8fV 1 , . . . ,V k g V0 2 rðzÞ : V 0 2 rðzÞ )
The attacker may construct new encryptions using the keys known
The attacker may actively forge new communications
The attacker initially has some knowledge fn,m the LySa calculus in Table 1 , a unique identifier u is associated to encryption and decryption and an id 2 ID is associated to public and private keys to specify the principal that encrypts a given message. The redefinition is obtained applying the function G to the processes of the protocol analysed that acts recursively on the subprocesses and redefines subterms using another function, called F . The definition of the functions F and G, that map standard terms and processes into the extended ones, is shown in Table 13 . Notice that the functions provide a new syntax in which:
id s are attached whenever an asymmetric key appears; a session identifier u is attached to each asymmetric encryption and decryption; parallel composition assigns a different id to each process, because the two processes belong to a different user; replication has a particular form that the semantic rules use to create replications of the process with different id s (that have to be unique).
Notice that we have generalized the approach [7] proposed by Gao to provide freshness property in a protocol. Indeed, the author defines two functions to attach a session identifier to each statement; then, she redefines the semantics, using the functions to avoid to redefine the structural congruence. In our analysis, because of the redefinition of the latter, we do not have to modify significantly the reduction semantics, except that the rule (NRNRep) takes advantage of a particular syntax that allows to attach different and unique identifiers to each process. Thus has to be removed because the structural equivalence does not hold in this case. The rule (NRNRep) will appropriately treat the behavior of the replication Parallel composition ½!P id Replication 0 Nil Table 13 Functions F and G. statement, as reported in Table 17 . Finally, we have to add the following annotations to the signatures:
[from id] is associated to encryption and it means that the recipient expects a message from id.
[check NR] is associated to decryption and it means that for all the elements of the set NR, non-repudiation property must be guaranteed. It is interesting to notice that the elements in the set NR can specify a part of the message, not necessarily the whole message, according to the definition of non-repudiation.
The syntax of asymmetric encryption and decryption becomes: fje 1 , . . . ,e k jg u e 0 ½from id decrypt e as fje 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k jg u e 0 ½check NR in P Notice that the annotation [from id] and the label u have a different role in the analysis. The first says that the principal who encrypted the message must be the same specified in the label associated to the private key used, while the second expresses that the message has to belong to a particular session.
In practice, when there is a violation due to the id s, it means that the attacker encrypted a message and sent it to a principal who expected it from another principal (remember that the attacker can even use a key known different from his key). Instead, when there is a violation due to the labels u, it means that the attacker made a replay attack using a message exchanged in a previous session.
Dynamic property
To guarantee the dynamic property, the values have to be redefined into NRVal, attaching the identifiers to the asymmetric key pairs and the annotations in the encryption constructs as shown below:
Furthermore, our extension involves redefinition of the semantics, of free names, of structural congruence, and of aÀequivalence, as described in Tables 17, 14 , 15, 16, respectively.
Notice that there are the following differences between the previous semantics and the one used in the analysis:
The asymmetric encryption and decryption are redefined adding a session identifier u, an identifier that shows who has encrypted a given cipher message, and the annotations above.
New terms e and processes P are used instead of the previous, E and P, which do not carry annotations. The process !P is not structurally equivalent to Pj!P, because of the recursive definition of the function G. Table 14 Redefinition of the function fn(P). The rule (NRNRep) in Table 17 assures that each process has a different id; starting from a replication process tagged with an identifier, the rule spawns a new process with the same identifier in parallel with another replication process associated now to a fresh unique identifier id 0 .
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We use the reference monitor semantics (-RM ), an extension of the standard semantics (-R ), to check the nonrepudiation property. Taking advantage of annotations, it forces some requirements and, if they are not meet, the process execution is aborted.
The reference monitor semantics P-RM P 0 takes annotations into account and defines RM as
where {NRV 1 ,y,NRV n } is a set of redefined values for non-repudiation analysis. When the reference monitor is turned on, the reduction relation -R checks if the requirements are met; otherwise R is considered true, i.e. the execution cannot be aborted for the requirements above, it verify only the assumptions of the standard rules. Intuitively, we verify if the message received is encrypted by the correct sender and if it is a fresh message. The main difference between the standard semantics and the redefined semantics is expressed by the rule used to verify a signature. In fact, when the reference monitor is turned on, the rules (NRNSig) ensure that the non-repudiation property holds for the elements specified by the annotations.
Definition 3 (Dynamic non-repudiation).
A process P ensures dynamic non-repudiation property if for all the executions
id ¼ id 0 and u ¼ u 0 and 8nr 2 NR : nr 2 fNRV 1 , . . . ,NRV k g when P 0 -RM P 00 is derived using (ASig) on Table 15 Redefinition of the structural congruence P P 0 .
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/e 1 , . . . ,e k S:P 1 /e 1 , . . . ,e k S:P 2 ðe 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k Þ:P 1 ðe 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k Þ:P 2 decrypt e as fe 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k g e0 in P 1 decrypt e as fe 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k g e0 in P 2 decrypt e as fje 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k jg u e0 ½check NR in P 1 decrypt e as fje 1 , . . . ,e j ;
P 1 P 2 ) ½!P 1 id ½!P 2 id if both P 1 and P 2 are annotated with the same id
Table 16
Redefinition of the aÀequivalence. 
½check NR in P Definition 3 says that an extended process P ensures non-repudiation property if there is no violation in any of its execution.
Static property
A component cDPðNRÞ will collect all the labels nr such that the non-repudiation property for the element nr is possibly violated.
The p operator is introduced to ignore the extension of the syntax and is defined as
where the relation NRV= V is defined to be the least equivalence between an element in NRVal and an element in Val that inductively ignores the identifiers and the annotations. The analyses of the terms and of the processes are shown in Tables 18 and 19 . The rule (NRASig) checks the nonrepudiation property whenever a signature is verified.
To prove the correctness of our analysis we must prove that it respects the extended operational semantics of LySa, i.e. if r,k,cFP then the triple ðr,k,cÞ is a valid estimate for all the states passed through in a computation of P. Furthermore, we prove that when c is empty, then the reference monitor is useless. Table 18 Non-repudiation analysis of terms r ' e : W. Our proof uses three lemmas, defined and proved below. The first and the second show that estimates are resistant to substitution of closed terms for variables, both in the terms and in the processes; the third says that an estimate for an extended process P is valid for every process congruent to P. Since both the bases and the inductive steps have been proved, it follows that Lemma 1 holds for all the expressions by structural induction. & Table 19 Non-repudiation analysis of processes r,k,cFP.
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V j i ¼ 1 NRV i ¼ NRV 0 i /NRV 1 , . . . ,NRV k S:PjðNRV 0 1 , . . . ,NRV 0 j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k Þ:P 0 -R PjP 0 ½NRV j þ 1 =x j þ 1 , . . . ,NRV k =x k (NRNDec) V j i ¼ 0 NRV i ¼ NRV 0 i decrypt fNRV 1 , . . . ,NRV k g NRV0 as fNRV 0 1 , . . . ,NRV 0 j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k g NRV 0 0 ½check NR in P-RP½NRV j þ 1 =x j þ 1 , . . . ,NRV k =x k (NRNADec) V j i ¼ 1 NRV i ¼ NRV 0 i decrypt fjNRV 1 , . . . ,NRV k jg u ½m þ id ½from id 0 as fjNRV 0 1 , . . . ,NRV 0 j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k jg u 0 ½m À id ½check NR in P-RP½NRV j þ 1 =x j þ 1 , . . . ,NRV k =x k (NRNSig) V j i ¼ 1 NRV i ¼ NRV 0 i 4RMðid,id 0 ,u,u 0 ,fNRV j þ 1 , . . . ,NRV k g,NRÞ decrypt fjNRV 1 , . . . ,NRV k jg u ½m À id ½from id 0 as fjNRV 0 1 , . . . ,NRV 0 j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k jg u 0 ½m þ id ½check NR in P-RP½NRV j þ 1 =x j þ 1 , . . . ,NRV k =x k (NRNNew) P-RP 0 ðnnÞP-RðnnÞP 0 (NRNANew) P-RP 0 ðn 7 ½m id ÞP-Rðn 7 ½m id ÞP 0 (NRNPar) P 1 -RP 0 1 P 1 jP 2 -RP 0 1 jP 2 (NRNCongr) P P 0 4P 0 -RP 00 4P 00 P 000 P-RP 000 (NRNRep) ½!P id -RGðP,idÞj½!P id 0(NRAN) rFn : W iff bnc 2 W (NRANp) rF½m þ id : W iff ½bm þ c id pW (NRANm) rF½m À id : W iff ½bm À c id pW (NRAVar) rFx : W iff rðbxcÞDW (NRAEnc) rFfe 1 , . . . ,e k g e0 : W iff V k i ¼ 0 rFe i : W i 4 8NRV 0 , . . . ,NRV k : V k i ¼ 0 NRV i pW i ) fNRV 1 , . . . ,NRV k g NRV0 pW (NRAAEnc) rFfje 1 , . . . ,e k jg u e0 ½from id : W iff V k i ¼ 0 rFe i : W i 4 8NRV 0 , . . . ,NRV k : V k i ¼ 0 NRV i pW i ) fjNRV 1 , . . . ,NRV k jg u ½NRV0 id 0 ½from idpW
Lemma 1 (Substitution in expressions
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r,k,cFdecrypt e as fe 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k g e0 in P
iff rFe : W4
r,k,cFdecrypt e as fje 1 , . . . ,e j ;
r,k,cF½!P id iff r,k,cFGðP,idÞ
Proof. By structural induction over processes. Case (Output). We assume Therefore, by the rule (NRAOut), we have r,k,cFP½e=x.
Case (Input). We assume
By hypothesis we have r,k,cFðe 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k Þ:P 0 e 2 rðxÞ
By Lemma 1 and the induction hypothesis on the subprocesses, it holds that
Therefore, by the rule (NRAInp), we have r,k,cFP½e=x.
Case (Symmetric decryption). We assume P ¼ decrypt e as fe 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k g e 0 in P 0 By hypothesis we have r,k,cFdecrypt e as fe 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k g e 0 in P 0 e 2 rðxÞ By Lemma 1 and the induction hypothesis on the subprocesses, it holds that
Therefore, by the rule (NRADec), we have r,k,cFP½e=x.
Case (Asymmetric decryption). We assume P ¼ decrypt e as fje 1 , . . . ,e j ; x j þ 1 , . . . ,x k jg u e 0 ½check NR in P Therefore, by the rule (NRANew), we have r,k,cFP½e=x.
Case (Parallel composition). We assume
By hypothesis we have r,k,cFP 1 jP 2 e 2 rðxÞ
By the induction hypothesis on the subprocesses, it holds that r,k,cFP 1 ½e=x r,k,cFP 2 ½e=x Therefore, by the rule (NRAPar), we have r,k,cFP½e=x.
Case (Replication). We assume Case (Nil). We assume
Since 0 ¼ 0½e=x and r,k,cF0, trivially it holds r,k,cFP½e=x.
Since both the basis and the inductive steps have been proved, it follows that Lemma 2 holds for all the processes by structural induction. & Lemma 3 (Invariance of structural congruence). If P Q and r,k,cFP then r,k,cFQ.
Proof. By inspection of the clauses defining P Q.
Case (Pj0 P). We assume r,k,cFPj0, then it must be r,k,cFP and r,k,cF0, therefore r,k,cFP.
Other cases can be proved in a similar way, therefore Lemma 3 holds for all the clauses. & Now, we can prove the correctness of the analysis by the theorem defined below. 
and we have to prove
From the hypothesis we obtain:
(1) ) (2) ) /e 1 , . . . ,e k S 2 k (4) and (6) )
rðbx i cÞ and r,k,cFQ
Therefore, when c ¼ |, we get immediately /e 1 , . . . ,e k S:Pjðe
Case (NRNDec). We assume r,k,cFdecrypt fe 1 , . . . ,e k g e0 as fe which amounts to:
(1) and
(2) ) fe 1 , . . . ,e k g e 0 pW (3) and (5) )
rðbx i cÞ and r,k,cFP
Therefore, when c ¼ |, we get immediately decrypt fe 1 , . . . ,e k g e 0 as fe
Case (NRNADec). We assume r,k,cFdecrypt fje 1 , . . . ,e k jg u e 0 ½from id 0 as
½check NR in P which amounts to:
and we have to prove r,k,cFP½e j þ 1 =x j þ 1 , . . . ,e k =x k :
and (5) )
Therefore, when c ¼ |, we get immediately
Case (NRNSig). We assume r,k,cFdecrypt fje 1 , . . . ,e k jg which amounts to:
We observe that 8nr 2 NR : ðidaid 0 3uau 0 3nr= 2fe j þ 1 , . . . ,e k gÞ ) bnrc 2 c follows from (5) Case (NRNNew). We assume r,k,cFðn nÞP, therefore ðnnÞP-R ðnnÞP 0 using rule (NRNNew) and the hypothesis P-R P 0 .
We have to prove r,k,cFðn nÞP Case (NRNANew). We assume r,k,cFðn7½m id ÞP, therefore ðn 7 ½m id ÞP-R ðn 7 ½m id ÞP 0 using rule (NRNANew) and the hypothesis P-R P 0 .
We have to prove r,k,cFðn7½m id ÞP 0 .
By the induction hypothesis r,k,cFP 0 and by the rule (NRAANew) r,k,cFðn7½m id ÞP Case (NRNRep). We assume r,k,cF½!P id which means that r,k,cFGðP,idÞ; we have to prove r,k,cFGðP,idÞj½!P id 0 .
But c does not contain information about id s, therefore r,k,cFGðP,id Ã Þ for all id Ã 2 ID, which means that r,k,cF½!P id 0 .
Therefore we get r,k,cFGðP,idÞj½!P id 0 and, when c ¼ |, it follows immediately that ½!P id -RM GðP,idÞj½!P id 0 . Since both the basis and the inductive steps have been proved, it follows that Theorem 1 holds for all the rules by induction. &
The attacker
In the setup of PjP , the attacker process P has to be annotated with the extended syntax. We will use a unique label u to indicate the session and a unique label id to indicate the encryption place used by the attacker. The Dolev-Yao condition has to be redefined to be used for the non-repudiation analysis, as shown in Table 20 .
The main enhancement with the usual LySa attacker can be seen in the rule (3) in Table 20 : whenever the attacker is able to get an encryption key and generate an encrypted message with that key, the receiver checks the id of the sender, and, in case the latter does not correspond to the intended one, the component c becomes non-empty, as a signal of a nonrepudiation violation.
Now we have to prove that the redefined Dolev-Yao condition holds and this is done by the following theorem. Proof. By structural induction on Q . Case of (NRAOut). We assume:
Q ¼ /e 1 , . . . ,e k S:P and we need to find W 1 , . . . ,W k and show Table 20 Redefinition of the attacker's capabilities.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
(1) The attacker may learn by eavesdropping V k2Ak 8/NRV 1 , . . . ,NRV k S 2 k :
The attacker may learn by decrypting messages with keys already known V k2AEnc 8fNRV 1 , . . . ,NRV k g NRV0 2 rðzÞ : NRV 0 2 rðzÞ )
½check NR in P :
The attacker initially has some knowledge fn,½m (3) is proved by induction hypothesis. Case of (NRANew). We assume:
and we need to show r,k,cFP. But this is true by induction hypothesis.
Case of (NRAANew). We assume:
Case of (NRAPar). We assume:
and we need to show
But this is true by induction hypothesis. Case of (NRARep). We assume:
and we need to show r,k,cFGðP,idÞ. But GðP,idÞ has the same type of ½!P id , therefore r,k,cFGðP,idÞ by induction hypothesis.
The case (NRANil) is trivial. Since both the basis and the inductive steps have been proved, it follows that Theorem 2 holds for all the rules of the analysis by structural induction. & Theorem 3. If P guarantees static non-repudiation then P guarantees dynamic non-repudiation.
Proof. If r,k,|FP sys and ðr,k,|Þ satisfies F DY RM then, by Theorems 1 and 2, RM does not abort P sys jQ regardless of the choice of attacker Q. &
Meta level analysis
The analysis seen so far only deals with one session. In order to get a more realistic analysis, it has to be enhanced to a meta level, like in [4, 7] . We have to add indexes to names and variables, as explained in Section 2, so a scenario with multiple principals can be modelled. The meta level non-repudiation analysis takes the form r,k,cF G M.
Example 2. Let us now consider the protocol seen in Example 1, namely the Zhou-Gollmann protocol [17] . The whole protocol has been extended using the annotations and the functions F and G. The resulting protocol is the following: After completing the analysis the component c is an empty set, i.e. the protocol guarantees non-repudiation even under attack. In fact, the attacker cannot create new encryptions because he has not knowledge about the private keys and he cannot make a replay attack because there is a unique label that identifies the session.
Over-approximation
When the analysis checks a protocol, we could expect that if the component c is empty then the protocol is correct, else the protocol does not guarantee the non-repudiation protocol. But the analysis cannot be precise, because of the infinitely many possible scenarios in which a protocol can be executed and the additional assumptions that can be made. Because of the over-approximation, our analysis can give sometimes a false positive, i.e. the component c is non-empty but the protocol is correct. It is important that the analysis does not mistake in the opposite direction, and this is what happens in practice, because the analysis says that the property holds if the protocol behaves as expected, therefore it never says that a protocol is correct even if it does not guarantee the non-repudiation property. Intuitively, when a protocol guarantees authentication, freshness and integrity of the messages, it should guarantee even non-repudiation. An example of false positive is given by the protocol described in [5] by Cederquist et al. In fact it does not use labels to identify sessions, and this is why our analysis says that this protocol does not guarantee non-repudiation property. However, the protocol is correct, because it distinguishes session runs thanks to the usage of fresh keys per-session. Our analysis requires a session identifier, but there is not any element that is used in each message of the protocol, so a principal cannot verify if a message belongs to a particular session or not; indeed, without the assumption of the unique keys, an attacker could pretend to be another principal, starting the protocol after eavesdropping a protocol run. The main protocol is the following: where H= h({M} K ) and h is a hash function. There are other two subprotocols used in case of dispute, i.e. when a principal does not finish the protocol execution, but we are interested only in the main protocol. The encoding with annotation is the following: Because of the lack of labels, the result of the analysis shows that a possible flaw may arise. The component c contains all the elements that are also in NR when jSj Z2. In fact, it does not use labels to identify the session, and this is why our analysis says that this protocol does not guarantee non-repudiation property. However, the protocol is correct, because of an implicit additional assumption on the uniqueness of the keys, which prevents from replay attacks.
Conclusions and future works
This paper extends the work by Buchholtz and Gao who defined a suite of analyses for security protocols, namely authentication, confidentiality [10] , freshness [9] , simple [3] and complex [8] type flaws. The annotations we introduce allow to express non-repudiation also for part of the message: this allows to tune the analysis focussing on relevant components. It results that the CFA framework developed for the process calculus LySa can be extended to security properties by identifying suitable annotations, thus re-using most of the theoretical work.
